Do we make decisions for other people based on our predictions of their preferences?: evidence from financial and medical scenarios involving risk by Batteux, Eleonore et al.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ptar20
Thinking & Reasoning
ISSN: 1354-6783 (Print) 1464-0708 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ptar20
Do we make decisions for other people based on
our predictions of their preferences? evidence
from financial and medical scenarios involving risk
Eleonore Batteux, Eamonn Ferguson & Richard J. Tunney
To cite this article: Eleonore Batteux, Eamonn Ferguson & Richard J. Tunney (2019):
Do we make decisions for other people based on our predictions of their preferences?
evidence from financial and medical scenarios involving risk, Thinking & Reasoning, DOI:
10.1080/13546783.2019.1592779
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2019.1592779
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 16 Apr 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 84
View Crossmark data
Do we make decisions for other people based on
our predictions of their preferences? evidence
from financial and medical scenarios
involving risk
Eleonore Batteuxa , Eamonn Fergusona and Richard J. Tunneyb
aUniversity of Nottingham, UK; bAston University, UK
ABSTRACT
The ways in which the decisions we make for others differ from the ones we
make for ourselves has received much attention in the literature, although
less is known about their relationship to our predictions of the recipient’s
preferences. The latter question is of particular importance given real-world
occurrences of surrogate decision-making which require surrogates to con-
sider the recipient’s preferences. We conducted three experiments which
explore this relationship in the medical and financial domains. Although there
were mean discrepancies between surrogate predictions and choices, we
identified a predictive relationship between the two. Moreover, when partici-
pants took high risks for themselves, it seems that they were not willing to
do so for others, even when they believed that the recipient’s preferences
were similar to their own. We discuss these findings relative to current theo-
ries and real-world instances of surrogate decision-making.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 13 November 2018; Accepted 5 March 2019
KEYWORDS surrogate decisions; self-other differences; risk preferences; medical decision-making;
financial decision-making; DMfO
Introduction
Background
Making a decision is often difficult given that the way it fulfils the decision-
maker’s goal can only be known in hindsight. Making the right decisions
for other people, which we term surrogate decisions, can be even more dif-
ficult due to the fact that they are often made in the absence of knowledge
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of the recipient’s wishes and values. Uncertainty concerning another’s util-
ities is thereby added to the uncertainty of the decision-making process
itself. Does that degree of uncertainty impact the way people make surro-
gate decisions or are we capable of predicting a recipient’s wishes and pref-
erences and making decisions accordingly? Do surrogates take into account
these factors or do they take a different approach to making such deci-
sions? These questions are essential to understanding how we make surro-
gate decisions, which is important given that a significant proportion of the
decisions we make are for other people. We aim to address the latter ques-
tion in this paper where we present three experiments which explore the
relationship between decision-makers’ predictions of a recipient’s utility
and the choices they make for the recipient. We present findings from two
domains involving risk in order to assess how that relationship might
change according to the content and context of the decision. We investi-
gate the financial domain, where self-other differences are not yet clearly
accounted for, and the medical domain, where the relationship between
choices and predictions is highly relevant to real world medical decisions.
Although many surrogate decisions are relatively trivial, such as choosing
a present, others involve life and death medical decisions. It is important to
understand how surrogate decision-makers integrate the recipient’s wishes
and preferences into their decision process in these situations with high
risks and stakes. When a patient is deemed to have lost their decision-mak-
ing capacity due to illness or injury, a surrogate (often next-of-kin) is asked
to make a decision on their behalf. These surrogates are usually instructed
to make a decision that is in the recipient’s best interest whilst also follow-
ing the substituted judgment standard, that is, making the decision the
recipient would have made if they were able to do so. A twofold question
therefore arises: can surrogates accurately predict the recipient’s wishes
and preferences, and if they can, are they guided by these predictions
when formulating their decision? Concerning surrogate accuracy, Shalowitz,
Garrett-Mayer, and Wendler (2006) showed in a systematic review that sur-
rogates’ predictions of patients’ treatment preferences in hypothetical scen-
arios were accurate only 68% of the time1. In terms of whether surrogates
take into account these preferences, qualitative research suggests that sur-
rogates experience a conflict between wanting to make a decision in
accordance with the patient’s values and factors such as preserving the
patient’s life or the family’s well-being (Dionne-Odom, Willis, Bakitas,
Crandall, & Grace, 2015; Schenker et al., 2012). These findings suggest that
1There are many other literatures that show that our predictions of others’ preferences are often
inaccurate, for example in gift giving (Galak, Givi, & Williams, 2016), willingness to pay (Frederick,
2012), the false-consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977) and the egocentric anchoring and
adjustment heuristic (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004).
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the substituted judgment standard may have unrealistic expectations of
surrogates’ decision-making, adding to the debate concerning its suitability
(Torke, Alexander, & Lantos, 2008).
Theories and models of surrogate decision-making
Tunney and Ziegler’s (2015) domain-general model of surrogate decision-
making proposes that surrogate decisions are the result of perspective tak-
ing that varies according to the features of the decision. These features are
expected to affect whether the decision maker is likely to engage in a simu-
lated perspective (predicting what the recipient would do), a benevolent
perspective (what the recipient should do), a projected perspective (what
the decision-maker would do if they were the recipient), and/or an egocen-
tric perspective (what the decision maker wants to do). In situations where
the quality of the decision is largely determined by the recipient’s own pref-
erences (buying a present for example), if the decision maker knows the
recipient well, a simulated decision is likely to be taken. However, if the
decision maker possesses little information about the recipient, they might
rely on a projected perspective. In situations where a high level of responsi-
bility is placed on the decision maker, they might be inclined to take as
much risk as they think is reasonable rather than how much risk they think
the recipient would take: a benevolent rather than a simulated decision.
Medical professionals for example are expected to adopt a more benevo-
lent or egocentric perspective if they fear the professional or legal conse-
quences of making the wrong decision, even if that means going against
what the patient would want, whereas a surrogate for a next-of-kin may
put more emphasis on a simulated perspective.
Theories specific to surrogate risk-taking do not speak of the relationship
between surrogate predictions and decisions but can offer an account of
their outcome. The Risk-as-Feelings hypothesis proposes that our subjective
risk preferences are the result of emotional reactions to the risk rather than
a purely cognitive evaluation of it (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch,
2001). In the context of surrogacy, the decision-maker is not the recipient
of the outcome of the decision, thereby introducing psychological distance
between the decision-maker and the outcome (Trope & Liberman, 2010).
There is what is termed a self-other empathy gap (Loewenstein, 1996)
which reduces the emotional involvement of the decision maker in the
decision process. The decision-maker’s emotional reactions to the prospect
of a risk would therefore be reduced when making a surrogate decision
compared to their own. It would follow, therefore, that surrogate decisions
are closer to risk neutrality. Although such a hypothesis can help us under-
stand how surrogate decisions differ from people’s own decisions, it does
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not admit the possibility that surrogate decisions could be in fact based on
surrogate predictions which may themselves be closer to risk neutrality.
Finally, Social Values Theory (Stone & Allgaier, 2008) proposes that self-
other differences in decisions involving risk will arise because surrogate
decisions are largely based on the social value placed on the risk, thereby
acting as a norm. It is plausible that surrogates take into account whether
risk-taking is socially valued or not, particularly when being held account-
able or when making a decision for a stranger, but again this does not
allow for the possibility that surrogates may take an approach that is largely
based on a simulated perspective.
Surrogate decisions and predictions involving risk
In the financial domain, the literature on self-other differences is rather
contradictory. There are findings suggesting that people are less risk averse
for others than for themselves (Batteux et al., 2017; Mengarelli, Moretti,
Faralla, Vindras, & Sirigu, 2014; Pollmann, Potters, & Trautmann, 2014;
Polman, 2012), while others showing that people are more risk-averse for
others (Eriksen & Kvaly, 2010; Fernandez-Duque & Wifall, 2007; Zaleska &
Kogan, 1971), as well as findings reporting no self-other differences
(Benjamin & Robbins, 2007; Stone, Yates, & Caruthers, 2002). These findings
concerning surrogate choices have been discussed relative to the Risk-as-
Feelings hypothesis (Batteux et al., 2017; Fernandez-Duque & Wifall, 2007),
reduced loss aversion (Mengarelli et al., 2014; Polman, 2012), increased cau-
tion due to responsibility (Zaleska & Kogan, 1971), and Social Values Theory
(Stone & Allgaier, 2008). However, there has been little mention of the inter-
play between surrogate predictions and surrogate choices.
The question concerning the relationship between surrogate predictions and
choices in financial decisions is one that can be posed given the similarities
between predictions and choices. It has been found that people’s surrogate
predictions are closer to risk neutrality than the decisions they make for them-
selves, both in the domain of gains where people were risk averse but pre-
dicted someone else to be less risk averse as well as in the domain of losses
where people were risk seeking and predicted that someone else would be less
risk seeking (Faro & Rottenstreich, 2006; Hadar & Fischer, 2008; Hsee & Weber,
1997; Krishnamurthy & Kumar, 2002). Research has also shown that people’s
surrogate choices are closer to risk neutrality than the decisions they make for
themselves in both gain and loss frames (Batteux, Ferguson, & Tunney, 2017;
Sun, Liu, Zhang, & Lu, 2016; Zhang, Liu, Chen, Shang, & Liu, 2017; Ziegler &
Tunney, 2015). Such findings suggest that perhaps in a financial context people
make surrogate decisions in accordance with their predictions of what that per-
son would do: they predict that person’s risk preferences and choose
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accordingly. However, it is difficult to establish whether similarities between
predictions and choices can tell us anything about whether surrogates engage
in simulated perspective-taking. In fact, Pahlke, Strasser, and Vieider (2015)
show that in some instances, people make more risk-averse choices when
choosing for themselves and someone else, as opposed to for themselves only,
but report that they believe others are more risk-seeking than them. In the fol-
lowing paper, we add to this evidence by presenting an alternative way of
investigating the relationship between surrogate choices and predictions which
allows us to directly compare them.
When faced with hypothetical treatment scenarios, research indicates
that decision-makers accept less risk for someone else than for themselves.
This has been shown when doctors make decisions or recommendations
for their patients (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012; Ubel, Angott, &
Zikmund-Fisher, 2011). These differences might arise due to an effect of
accountability whereby physicians feel the need to be able to justify their
choices to others (Ubel et al., 2011) and fear the legal consequences of their
decisions (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012), thereby reducing the risk they
are prepared to take for a patient relative to themselves. This has also been
found when people from the general population make decisions for a
hypothetical patient or a family member (Dore, Stone, & Buchanan, 2014;
Oliver, 2013; Petrova, Garcia-Retamero, & Van Der Pligt, 2016; Zikmund-
Fisher, Sarr, Fagerlin, & Ubel, 2006), which has been discussed as the result
of employing greater caution when making a decision for someone else
(Oliver, 2013) and the need to justify one’s decisions (Zikmund-Fisher et al.,
2006), in which case maximising survival chances is easier to defend.
Concerning predictions, Garcia-Retamero and Galesic (2012) report that
general practitioners predict their patients to either be more risk-seeking
than themselves or have similar risk preferences but make more risk-averse
choices for them than for themselves. They also find a positive correlation
between doctors’ own preferences and their predictions of patients’, but
none between their predictions of patients’ preferences and the choices
they make for them. This suggests on the one hand that there is a discrep-
ancy between doctors’ surrogate predictions and surrogate choices, and on
the other that their predictions of a patient’s risk preferences are related to
their own preferences, which is a common finding across the medical litera-
ture (Fagerlin, Danks, Ditto, & Houts, 2001; Raymark, 2000). Similar results
have been reported in a study where participants made more risk-averse
vaccination decisions for a younger sister they were responsible for than for
themselves, irrespective of the sister’s preferences (Petrova et al., 2016). Our
aim in this paper is to further explore the relationship between surrogate
predictions and choices of ordinary decision-makers in order to understand
how self-other differences arise in the medical domain when making
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decisions for a stranger, whilst setting aside the professional and legal con-
straints felt by doctors when making such decisions.
There is also evidence that in relationship scenarios, young adults take more
risks for others than themselves but believe that others would take the same level
of risk as them (Stone & Allgaier, 2008). However, we believe that the scenarios
described in each domain are different enough that findings from one domain
cannot be assumed to translate to other domains. Indeed, individuals’ risk prefer-
ences are not constant across domains (Zou & Scholer, 2016), nor do they attend
to probabilities in the same way (Pachur, Hertwig, & Wolkewitz, 2014) or perceive
the ratio between gains and losses to be equivalent (Zou & Scholer, 2016).
Furthermore, Tunney and Ziegler’s (2015) model of surrogate decision-making
predicts that different features of the decision will impact perspective-taking.
Different levels of accountability might be held against a medical and a financial
decision-maker. The fact that self-other differences have been more consistent in
the medical than the financial domain also suggests that there may be important
differences between the twowhich should not be disregarded.
The present research
We present three experiments which explore the relationship between sur-
rogate predictions and choices in both medical and financial domains when
ordinary people make decisions on behalf of strangers. The way we investi-
gate this is different from the literature in that we use a within-subjects
design. This allows us to assess whether participants’ surrogate predictions
are predictive of their surrogate choices, instead of comparing choices and
predictions in a between-subjects design. In doing so, we can infer whether
surrogates might compute a simulated perspective when making their deci-
sions, rather than inferring that they do not in light of discrepancies
between choices and predictions. We can then compare decisions across
domains in order to draw conclusions regarding whether surrogates are
more likely to take a simulated approach in a particular domain.
We have two research questions which require different analyses. The
first is whether surrogate predictions are predictive of surrogate choices. To
answer it, we will conduct partial correlations between surrogate predic-
tions and choices, controlling for choices for the self. We will also conduct
multiple linear regressions with surrogate choices as an outcome variable
and surrogate predictions and choices for the self as predictor variables.
The second question is whether any self-other differences in choices can be
accounted for by a perceived difference in participants’ own choices and
the recipient’s choices. To answer it, we will conduct linear regressions with
the self-other difference in choices as an outcome variable and the self-
other difference in predictions as a predictor variable.
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Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we examine surrogate risk-taking in the financial domain.
A number of potential explanations as to why self-other differences in
decisions involving risk may arise in financial decisions have been pro-
posed. The Risk-as-Feelings hypothesis suggests that the decisions we
make for others will be closer to risk neutrality than our own. However, if
surrogate decisions are based on surrogate predictions, we would again
expect these to be closer to risk neutrality than our own decisions given
the evidence mentioned above. Given that both suggested explanations
would lead to similar outcomes, we need to investigate them in a way
that can assess their relative contribution. We assessed self-other differen-
ces by asking participants to make a series of choices between two gam-
bles, one with a high probability of winning a small amount and the other
with a low probability of winning a large amount. Participants also com-
pleted a task where they were are asked to give a rating to each bet. The
key manipulation is that participants are asked to predict the recipient’s
utility of each bet in order to identify whether surrogates’ choices are
coherent with their perception of the recipient’s utility of the bets. In
other words, do participants predict someone else’s ratings of the bets to
differ from their own? Moreover, is there a relationship between partici-
pants’ predictions of someone else’s ratings and the choices they make
for them?
Method
Design
A 2 (Recipient) x 2 (Task) within-subjects design was used where partici-
pants complete a choice task and a rating task for themselves and for
another participant.
Participants
Participants (n¼ 36) were recruited from the University of Nottingham. The
age group ranged from 18 to 34 (M¼ 21.97, SD = 3.57). There were 12
males and 24 females. Ethics approval was obtained from the ethics com-
mittee at the University of Nottingham.
Stimuli
The stimuli were 27 pairs of bets, each made up of a P-bet and a £-bet. P-
bets consisted of a high probability of winning a modest amount of money
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and a low probability of losing a modest amount of money. £-bets con-
sisted of a low probability of winning a large amount of money and a high
probability of losing a modest amount of money. The stimuli were those
used by Tunney (2006), with the only difference being that all amounts
were multiplied by a factor of 10. Each pair had a very similar expected
value, the highest difference being £3.75. Expected values varied between
£11.70 and £43. The amounts that could be won varied between £15 and
£500. The amounts that could be lost varied between £1.50 and £80. The
amount to win in £-bets was always larger than in P-bets. In all bets, the
amount that could be won was always higher or equal to the amount that
could be lost.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two sessions which were completed by partici-
pants 3-7 days apart. Participants made decisions for themselves in one ses-
sion and for another participant in the other. The order in which
participants completed the sessions was counterbalanced across partici-
pants. Each session was composed of two stages which were both com-
pleted on a computer using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). The first stage was the
choice phase where participants made choices between the paired P-bets
and £-bets. The second stage was the rating phase2. When making deci-
sions for themselves, participants were asked to imagine that the bets were
in the form of a lottery ticket and indicate the minimum selling price they
would be prepared to sell the bet for, such that they would be indifferent
to whether they played the bet or received the selling price instead. When
making decisions for someone else, participants were asked to predict the
minimum price they think that person would be prepared to sell the bet
for. Bets were rated individually and presented in random order. The 6 bets
which served as practice trials in the choice phase were also used as prac-
tice trials in the rating phase. To reiterate, participants were asked to make
choices for another participant in the choice phase but predict what the
recipient would do in the rating phase.
Participant compensation
Participants were told that the amount of money they would get as com-
pensation would vary according to decisions made in the choice phase.
For every participant, one of the bets they chose for themselves and one
of the bets the previous participant had chosen for them was played for
2We call this task a rating task to differentiate it from the choice task. However, both tasks can be
conceptualised as two different decision questions.
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real money. A small proportion of the amounts that were won (or lost)
were added (or subtracted) to (or from) their initial inconvenience allow-
ance of £4. The proportion of the amounts was adjusted so that partici-
pants would obtain on average £5. The bets that were played for real
money were selected at random and participants were not told which
ones they were.
Results
There were no differences between the proportion of P-bet choices for self
(M¼ 0.76, SD = 0.24, CI [0.68, 0.84]) and for other (M¼ 0.76, SD = 0.24, CI
[0.70, 0.82]) (t35=0.093, p=.926). To assess whether participants predicted
the other participant’s ratings to be different to their own, we computed
the mean rating for each type of bet in each condition (see Figure 1).
Participants’ own ratings and their predictions of another person’s ratings
were entered into a 2 (Recipient) x 2 (Type of Bet) repeated-measures
ANOVA. There was no main effect of recipient (F1,35=1.243, MSe=108.047,
p=.273). There was a main effect of type of bet (F1,35=8.153, MSe=845.808,
p=.007, gp
2=0.189): participants rated the £-bet higher than the P-bet. There
was no interaction between recipient and type of bet (F1,35=1.017,
MSe=66.617, p=.320).
Figure 1. Means of participants’ own ratings and their predictions of another’s per-
son’s ratings of the £-bet and the-P bet (Experiment 1). Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean.
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We identified whether there was a relation between participants’ predic-
tions of other people’s ratings of the bets and the choices they made for
them using Pearson’s correlations. We used the difference between ratings
of the £-bet and ratings of the P-bet as a measure of ratings of the bets by
subtracting P-bet ratings from £-bet ratings. There was no association
between the proportion of P-bet choices for other and ratings of the bets
(r¼ 0.077 [-0.266, 0.360]3, p=.657). We compared this to the relation
between participants’ own ratings and choices, where there was a negative
correlation between the proportion of P-bet choices for self and ratings of
the bets (r=-0.660 [-0.867, -0.251], p<.001). This means that the higher par-
ticipants rated the £-bets relative to the P-bets, the more likely they were
to choose them for themselves.
We then assessed whether surrogate predictions of ratings had a rela-
tionship with choices independently of participants’ own ratings and
choices. We performed a partial correlation between P-bet choices for other
and ratings for other, controlling for P-bet choices and ratings for self,
which was not significant (r¼ 0.232, p=.187). We also conducted a multiple
linear regression, with surrogate P-bet choices as the outcome variable and
ratings for other, ratings for self and P-bet choices for self as predictor varia-
bles. We found that the model was significant (F2,32=4.477, p=.010) and
accounted for 29.6% of the variance in surrogate choices. Surrogate predic-
tions did not predict surrogate choices (B¼ 0.003, SE¼ 0.002, p=.187), nor
did participants’ own ratings (B< 0.001, SE¼ 0.002, p=.885). However, par-
ticipants’ own choices did (B¼ 0.442, SE¼ 0.150, p=.006). Participants’ likeli-
hood of choosing the P-bet for another person increases as their likelihood
of choosing the P-bet for themselves increases.
Discussion
There were no self-other differences in choices and no differences between
people’s own ratings and their predicted surrogate ratings, suggesting that
they predicted another person’s utility of the bets to be similar to their
own. The absence of self-other differences could be due to the fact that
participants do not perceive the recipient’s utility of the bets to be different
to their own. We did not find a relationship between participants’ surrogate
ratings and choices. When participants predicted that another person
would rate the £-bet highly, they did not show a preference for the £-bet
when choosing on their behalf. This suggests that, in financial decisions,
surrogates either do not compute the other person’s utilities when making
a decision on their behalf, or may not heavily rely on them, if at all. On the
395% confidence intervals were obtained via 1000 bootstrapped samples.
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other hand, it could be that the two different modes of preference elicit-
ation lead to decisions that are not related, rather than surrogate predic-
tions and choices not being related. This is coherent with literature on
preference reversals, which shows that, like we found here, people favour
the P-bet in the choice task but the £-bet in the rating task (Lichtenstein &
Slovic, 1971). However, there was a relationship between participants’ own
ratings and choices. Rating the £-bet highly increased the likelihood of
choosing it over the P-bet when making a decision for oneself, which
means that the two modes of preference elicitation were related when par-
ticipants decided for themselves. Therefore, our finding that they were not
for others is indicative of the relationship between surrogate predictions
and decisions.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we examine the relationship between surrogate choices
and predictions in medical scenarios. Participants were recruited from the
general population in order to assess whether self-other differences
observed in doctors for their patients also arise when ordinary people make
decisions for others. We included both scenarios which depicted moderate
and severe conditions. The decisions we presented in Experiment 1 had
outcomes which were relatively small, and much smaller than scenarios in
the medical literature. The health literature cited above includes scenarios
of varying significance, from resulting in mild symptoms to death, but has
not yet looked at whether less significant scenarios alters self-other differ-
ences. In the interpersonal domain, self-other differences have been found
for low-impact but not high-impact scenarios (Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, &
Allgaier, 2003; Stone & Allgaier, 2008), suggesting that outcome significance
might affect self-other differences in the medical domain.
We investigate self-other differences using the QALY (quality-adjusted
life years) standard gamble (SG) task commonly used to measure the utility
of health outcomes (Whitehead & Ali, 2010). The SG task is designed to
measure utility under risk for a particular medical condition by presenting a
choice between a safe option (staying in that condition) and a risky option
(taking a risky treatment). We investigate predictions by adding a measure
of utility without a risk component using the time trade-off (TTO) QALY task
which elicits an expression of the participant’s value of a particular medical
condition. Surrogates are asked to predict the recipient’s utilities in the TTO
task and make choices for the recipient in the SG task. This allows for a
comparison between surrogates’ decisions under risk and their predictions
of the recipient’s value of the medical condition in order to evaluate
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whether surrogate choices can be accounted for by the surrogate’s percep-
tion of the recipient’s value of the condition.
The reason we use the TTO task, rather than eliciting surrogate predic-
tions in the SG gamble task, is to avoid interpretation difficulties if we find
that surrogate choices and predictions are congruent, as in the financial lit-
erature, which could mean that surrogates are making a simulated decision,
but it could also be the result of an attenuation of the participant’s own
risk preference in both cases or the participant’s motivation for consistency.
Using the TTO task does not eliminate all alternative explanations, but it
does place the participant in a slightly different context when predicting
the recipient’s utilities, which can tell us something informative about sur-
rogate predictions, independently from the surrogate choices made in the
SG task. Given the literature, we do not anticipate self-other differences in
surrogate predictions, but we do expect differences in surrogate choices,
and therefore hypothesise that surrogate predictions cannot account for
surrogate choices.
Method
Design. A 2 (Recipient) x 2 (Magnitude) x 2 (Task) repeated-measures design
was used. The first factor ‘Recipient’ was a within-subjects factor where par-
ticipants made decisions for themselves (self) and for another participant
(other). The second factor ‘Magnitude’ was a within-subjects factor relating
to the severity of the health state. The third factor ‘Task’ was a within-sub-
jects factor, which refers to whether utilities were elicited via the SG or the
TTO task.
Participants. Participants (n¼ 36) were recruited from the University of
Nottingham. The age group ranged from 20 to 47 (M¼ 25.40, SD = 5.66).
There were 10 males and 26 females. Ethics approval was obtained from
the ethics committee at the University of Nottingham.
Materials and Procedure. Participants completed the experiment on a
computer using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). They completed two different
tasks which were designed to measure their utilities of each illness. Utilities
were taken as measures of value or preference for health states and were
bounded by 0 (prefer to die rather than live with condition) and 1 (indiffer-
ent between condition and full health). In both tasks, participants were pre-
sented with six scenarios (three moderate and three severe conditions, see
Appendix). Two of the severe conditions (paraplegia and Broca’s aphasia)
were adapted from Rosen, Tsai, and Downs (2003) because they elicited
low utilities, to which we added a vegetative state scenario. Angina was
used as a moderate condition because it elicited high utilities in Read,
Quinn, Berwick, Fineberg, and Weinstein (1984), to which we added a
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headache and a nausea scenario. In all scenarios, it is specified that without
treatment there is no chance of recovery. Participants completed each task
twice: once for themselves and once for another unknown participant who
they were told was also a student. The SG task measures how much risk
participants are willing to take to recover, whereas the TTO task measures
how many years of their life participants are willing to sacrifice to recover.
The SG task measures risk preferences whereas the TTO task does not.
In the SG task, participants were given the choice between a safe option:
remaining in a condition (paraplegia, Broca’s aphasia, vegetative state,
angina, headache, nausea) and a risky option: a treatment with a probability
p of complete recovery and a probability 1-p of death. The probability p in
the risky option was presented in descending order (100%, 95%, 90%, 80%,
70%, 60%, 50%, 40%, 30%, 20%, 10%, 5%, 0%) until respondents switched
from choosing the risky option to the safe option. They made these choices
once for themselves and once on behalf of another participants. In the TTO
task, participants were asked to indicate how many years in full health were
for them equivalent to 50 years with the disease. In other words, how many
years of their life would they trade-off or sacrifice to live in full health. The
years they would rather live in perfect health divided by 50 years was taken
as the measure of utility. Crucially, when completing the task for another
participant, they were asked to predict what the participant would do: in
other words, how many years in full health would be equivalent for that
participant to 50 years with the disease.
Half the participants completed both tasks for themselves first whereas
half the participants completed both tasks for another participant first. Half
the participants completed the SG task first in each block of recipient and
half the participants completed the TTO task first in each block of recipient.
In the SG task participants were asked to make choices on behalf of the
participant, whereas in the TTO task participants were asked to predict
what they think the participant would do.
Results
For responses in the SG task, we computed participants’ utilities of the
medical scenarios for each recipient by taking their indifference point
between taking the risky option and the safe option. The indifference point
is the average of the two probabilities either side of the crossover point
from the risky to the safe option. Utilities varied between 0 and 1 where 0
indicates that they always chose the risky option and 1 indicates that they
always chose the sure option. We then averaged utilities for moderate and
severe conditions to have an overall utility for each magnitude. We con-
verted responses on the TTO task to a utility that varied between 0 and 1,
THINKING & REASONING 13
where 0 indicates that they would rather die than live at all with the condi-
tion and 1 indicates that they are not willing to sacrifice any life years to
live in full health.
We entered these utilities in a 2 (Recipient) x 2 (Magnitude) x 2 (Task)
repeated measures ANOVA (see Figure 2). There was a main effect of task
(F1,35=37.818, MSE¼ 0.075, p<.001, gp2=0.519), a main effect of magnitude
(F1,35=98.241, MSE¼ 0.062, p<.001, gp2=0.737). The main effect of recipient
was not significant (F1,35=2.986, MSE¼ 0.022, p=.093, gp2=0.079). Of primary
interest, there was an interaction between recipient and task (F1,35=6.044,
MSE¼ 0.016, p=.019, gp2=0.147). According to a simple effects analysis, par-
ticipants’ utilities were higher for someone else than for themselves in the
SG task (mean difference=-0.06, p=.025), but there were no differences on
the TTO task (mean difference=-0.004, p=.804). There was also an inter-
action between recipient and magnitude (F1,35=38.179, MSE¼ 0.007,
p<.001, gp
2=0.522). According to a simple effects analysis, participants’ util-
ities were higher for someone else than for themselves for severe condi-
tions (mean difference=-0.09, p=.001), but slightly lower for someone else
for moderate conditions (mean difference = 0.03, p=.050). The interaction
between recipient, task and magnitude was not significant (F1,35=3.499,
MSE¼ 0.005, p=.070, gp2=0.091).
Figure 2. Average utility for each recipient, magnitude and utility estimation task with
error bars representing the standard error of the mean (Experiment 2). Higher utilities
indicate less risk-taking in the SG task and less life years sacrificed in the TTO task.
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To explore whether surrogate choices and predictions were related, we
conducted Pearson’s correlations between utilities in the SG and the TTO
task. Surrogate choices in the SG task were positively correlated to surro-
gate predictions in the TTO task for severe conditions (r¼ 0.503 [0.272,
0.688], p=.002) but not for moderate conditions (r¼ 0.061 [-0.253, 0.388],
p=.725). Similarly, for themselves, participants’ utilities in both tasks were
positively correlated for severe conditions (r¼ 0.534 [0.215, 0.763], p=.001)
but not for moderate conditions (r=-0.127 [-0.431, 0.289], p=.461).
We then assessed whether surrogate predictions in the TTO task pre-
dicted surrogate choices in the SG task independently of participants’ own
choices in the SG task and ratings in the TTO task. Partial correlations
between surrogate predictions and choices, controlling for self ratings and
choices, were significant for severe conditions (r¼ 0.606, p<.001) but not
moderate conditions (r¼ 0.192, p=.269). We also conducted a multiple lin-
ear regression with surrogate choices as the outcome variable and ratings
for other, ratings for self and choices for self as predictor variables. For
severe conditions, the model was significant (F2,32=13.555, p<.001) and
accounted for 56.0% of the variance in surrogate choices. Surrogate predic-
tions positively predicted surrogate choices (B¼ 0.668, SE¼ 0.155, p<.001)
and so did participants’ own choices (B¼ 0.551, SE¼ 0.119, p<.001). On the
other hand, participants’ own ratings negatively predicted surrogate
choices (B=-0.563, SE¼ 0.183, p=.004). For moderate conditions, the model
was significant (F2,32=8.677, p<.001) and accounted for 44.9% of the vari-
ance in surrogate choices. Surrogate predictions did not predict surrogate
choices (B¼ 0.021, SE¼ 0.178, p=.908), nor did participants’ own ratings
(B¼ 0.094, SE¼ 0.184, p=.611), but their own choices did (B¼ 0.714,
SE¼ 0.141, p<.001).
The fact that we used a within-subjects design suggests there might be
contamination between the SG task and the TTO task. Participants who
completed the TTO task first were asked to take the recipient’s perspective
before making a choice on their behalf. To evaluate whether the order in
which participants completed both tasks affected the relationship between
predictions and choices, we added the order in which participants com-
pleted the tasks as a predictor into the regression model with severe condi-
tions. The model remained significant (F4,31=9.858, p<.001) and accounted
for 56.0% of the variance, but order was not a significant predictor (B=-
0.006, SE¼ 0.045, p=.898). However, surrogate predictions (B¼ 0.666,
SE¼ 0.158, p<.001), participants’ own choices (B¼ 0.544, SE¼ 0.132,
p<.001) and participants’ own ratings (B=-0.562, SE¼ 0.186, p=.005) pre-
dicted surrogate choices. We also checked whether order was a predictor of
the difference between surrogate predictions and choices for severe condi-
tions. The model was not significant (F1,34=0.347, p=.559).
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Finally, we assessed whether participants’ perceived difference between
their own and the recipient’s values in the TTO task could account for the
self-other differences we found in the SG task. We conducted a linear
regression with the difference between self and other on the SG task as the
outcome variable and the difference between self and other on the TTO
task as the predictor variable. Given that the relationship between predic-
tions and choices differed by outcome magnitude, we ran two separate
analyses. For severe conditions, we found that the model was significant
(F1,34=21.985, p<.001) and accounted for 39.3% of the variance in self-other
differences in choices. The self-other difference in ratings was a significant
predictor of the self-other difference in choices (B¼ 0.798, SE¼ 0.170,
p<.001). For moderate conditions, the model was not significant
(F1,34=0.011, p=.916).
Discussion
In terms of surrogate decisions, they were more risk-averse than people’s
own decisions for severe medical conditions, which supports the hypothesis
that medical scenarios elicit a more cautious approach to surrogate deci-
sion-making. However, they were slightly more risk-seeking than partici-
pants’ own decisions for moderate conditions. This could be due to the fact
that people were more risk-seeking for severe than moderate conditions
and were not prepared to take that level of risk on behalf of the recipient.
In terms of surrogate predictions, participants perceived the recipient’s util-
ities of the medical conditions to be slightly lower than their own, indicat-
ing that there is a discrepancy between surrogate predictions and choices.
For both severe and moderate conditions, we found that participants’ own
choices predicted their surrogate choices. Crucially, for severe conditions,
surrogate predictions predicted surrogate choices independently of partici-
pants’ own utilities. This suggests that predictions inform choices, even if
they cannot fully account for the variance in choices. In other words, surro-
gates take into account their predictions of the recipient’s utilities, but
there are other factors driving the reduction in risk-taking. Other possibil-
ities remain, however, such as it is in fact choices that inform predictions, or
that they are both influenced by a common underlying mechanism. For
moderate conditions, we did not find a relationship between predictions
and choices for either self or other. It is therefore unclear whether surrogate
predictions are not related to decisions for moderate conditions, or whether
the SG and TTO tasks are more strongly related for severe than moder-
ate conditions.
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Experiment 3
Experiment 1 and 2 show that the relationship between surrogate choices
and predictions differs between domains. In financial decisions, although
we did not find self-other differences in either choices or ratings, surrogate
ratings did not predict surrogate choices. In medical decisions, although we
found conflicting self-other differences in choices and ratings, surrogate rat-
ings did predict surrogate choices in the case of severe illnesses. This sug-
gests that participants are integrating a simulated approach when making
medical decisions but not financial decisions. We therefore conducted a
third experiment with a larger sample size to directly compare the relation-
ship between surrogate choices and predictions in both domains.
Although the specific choice trials were taken from Experiments 1 and 2,
we had to make a number of amendments to their designs in order to con-
duct a feasible experiment. Firstly, we needed to ensure that we used a
unique dependent variable that we could then enter in an analysis of vari-
ance. It was therefore difficult to use the ratings task from Experiment 1.
Instead, we compared surrogate choices with surrogate predictions on the
same task, meaning that participants completed the same task three times
(self, other, predictions) in each domain, with preference for the safer
option as the dependent variable. This also eliminates the interpretation
difficulties that arise from using two different tasks to compare choices and
predictions. Secondly, we wanted to make sure that the experiment was
not too long in order to sustain participants’ attention throughout and pre-
serve the quality of the data. To this end, we selected particular trials from
Experiment 1 (16 of the 24 choice trials) and Experiment 2 (severe condi-
tions). The fact that participants completed three tasks per domain rather
than four also contributed to shortening the experiment.
Method
Design
A 3 (Recipient) x 2 (Domain) within-subjects design was used where participants
made choices for themselves, for another participant, and predictedwhat another
participant would do. Theymade choices in the financial andmedical domains.
Participants
Participants (n¼ 80) were recruited via Prolific. The age group ranged from 18
to 35 (M¼ 27.51, SD = 5.11). There were 23 males and 57 females with varying
levels of education. All participants resided in the United Kingdom to ensure
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that the currency used (£) in the task was relevant to all. Ethical approval was
obtained from the ethics committee at the University of Nottingham.
Choice task
The financial choices consisted of 16 pairs of bets, each made up of a P-bet
and a £-bet, taken from Experiment 1. We chose the bets that had the larg-
est difference between the probabilities of the P-bet and of the £-bet, in
order to further validate the P-bet as the safest option. The only difference
was that all amounts were multiplied by a factor 10 in order to make the
scenarios more significant to participants. The medical choices were identi-
cal to the SG task with severe conditions (paraplegia, Broca’s aphasia, vege-
tative state) in Experiment 2.
Procedure
Participants completed each choice task three times: once for themselves,
once for another participant, and once where they had to predict what the
other participant would do. They were told to imagine that the other par-
ticipant was of a similar age and situation to them. The order in which they
completed each task (self-financial, other-financial, predict-financial, self-
medical, other-medical, predict-medical) was randomised. The order in
which they completed the trials within each task was randomised.
Results
Data pre-processing
In the financial domain, we took the proportion of P-bet choices as a meas-
ure of risk-taking. In the medical domain, we computed participants’ util-
ities of the medical scenarios for each recipient by taking their indifference
point between taking the risky option and the safe option. The indifference
point is the average of the two probabilities either side of the crossover
point from the risky to the safe option. Utilities varied between 0 and 1
where 0 indicates that they always chose the risky option and 1 indicates
that they always chose the sure option. We then averaged utilities across
medical conditions to have an overall utility. 5 participants were excluded
from the analysis as an indifference point could not be computed from the
choices they made because they were inconsistent (for example, choosing
a treatment which has a 50% chance of working but not one which has a
70% chance of working). 75 participants remained in the analysis.
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Analysis of variance
We conducted our analysis with a 3 (recipient) x 2 (domain) repeated-meas-
ures ANOVA (see Figure 3). We did not expect to find an effect of recipient
in the financial domain, given that we did not find self-other differences in
Experiment 1. However, we did expect to find an effect of recipient in the
medical domain whereby choices for the self and predictions of the recipi-
ent’s choices are more risk-taking than surrogate choices. We therefore pre-
dicted a 2-way interaction between recipient and domain and use simple
effects analyses to further analyse our results.
We found a main effect of recipient (F2,148=5.100, MSe=315.434, p=.007,
gp
2=0.064). Surrogate choices were more risk-averse than participants’ own
choices (mean difference = 4.628, p=.014) and surrogate predictions (mean
difference = 6.328, p=.005), but there were no differences between partici-
pants’ own choices and surrogate predictions (mean difference = 1.699,
p=.417). We found a main effect of domain (F1,74=47.921, MSe=983.228,
p<.001, gp
2=0.393) whereby choices in the financial domain were more
risk-averse than in the medical domain (mean difference = 20.465, p<.001).
Crucially, we found an interaction between recipient and domain
(F2,148=5.390, MSe=304.990, p=.006, gp
2=0.068). In the financial domain, par-
ticipants predicted that the recipient would be more risk-seeking than
Figure 3. Participants’ choices for each recipient by domain with error bars repre-
senting the standard error of the mean (Experiment 3). In the financial domain,
higher values indicate a higher preference for the P-bet. In the medical domain,
higher values indicate a higher preference for staying in the medical condition as
opposed to taking the treatment.
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them (mean difference = 8.083, p=.022, d¼ 0.31), yet were not significantly
more risk-taking for the recipient than for themselves (mean difference =
0.083, p=.981, d¼ 0.004). Consequently, their surrogate choices and predic-
tions were significantly different (mean difference = 8.000, p=.044, d¼ 0.28).
In the medical domain, participants predicted that the recipient would be
more risk-averse than them (mean difference = 4.684, p=.023, d¼ 0.19) and
made more risk-averse choices for the recipient than for themselves (mean
difference = 9.340, p<.001, d¼ 0.38). Surrogate choices were also more risk-
averse than surrogate predictions (mean difference = 4.656,
p=.016, d¼ 0.21).
We did not find self-other differences in the financial domain, but we did
find that participants expect others to be more risk-taking than them.
However, they seem to make similar decisions for them than they would
for themselves. In the medical domain on the other hand, participants
expect others to be more risk-averse than them and make more risk-averse
decisions for them. Nevertheless, their surrogate decisions are more risk-
averse than what they would predict the recipient’s to be. We can conclude
that there are discrepancies between surrogate choices and predictions,
but that surrogate choices are more in line with surrogate predictions in
the medical domain than they are in the financial domain.
Regression analyses
We performed Pearson’s correlations to explore the relationship between
surrogate choices and predictions. Surrogate choices and predictions were
positively correlated in the financial (r¼ 0.316 [0.062, 0.562], p=.006) and
the medical domain (r¼ 0.732 [0.586, 0.839], p<.001), although that rela-
tionship was much stronger in the medical domain. Partial correlations
between surrogate choices and predictions, controlling for participants’
own choices, were significant in the financial domain (r¼ 0.292, p=.012)
and in the medical domain (r¼ 0.333, p=.004).
We then performed regression analyses to assess whether surrogate pre-
dictions were predictive of surrogate choices, independently of participants’
own choices. In the financial domain, we found that the model was signifi-
cant (F2,72=4.002, p=.022) and accounted for 10% of the variance in surro-
gate choices. Surrogate predictions significantly predicted surrogate
choices (B¼ 0.249, SE¼ 0.096, p=.012), but participants’ own choices did
not (B=-0.001, SE¼ 0.158, p=.996). In the medical domain, we found that
the model was significant (F2,72=80.337, p<.001) and accounted for 69.1%
of the variance in surrogate choices. Surrogate predictions significantly pre-
dicted surrogate choices (B¼ 0.292, SE¼ 0.098, p=.004), but so did partici-
pants’ own choices (B¼ 0.513, SE¼ 0.085, p<.001). The model accounted
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for more variance in surrogate choices in the medical domain than it did in
the financial domain.
We assessed whether participants’ perceived difference between their
own and the recipient’s ratings could account for self-other differences in
choices for each domain using a linear regression. In the financial domain,
the model was significant (F1,73=10.605, p=.002) and accounted for 12.7%
of the variance in surrogate choices. Differences between surrogate choices
and predictions were predictive of self-other differences in choices
(B¼ 0.355, SE¼ 0.109, p=.002). In the medical domain, the model was sig-
nificant (F1,73=24.958, p<.001) and accounted for 25.5% of the variance in
surrogate choices. Differences between surrogate choices and predictions
were predictive of self-other differences in choices (B¼ 0.440, SE¼ 0.088,
p<.001). Again, the model accounted for more variance in surrogate
choices in the medical domain than it did in the financial domain.
Finally, we checked whether the order in which participants completed
surrogate predictions and decisions was a predictor of the difference
between the two. For each domain, we ran a 2 (Condition) x 2 (Order)
ANOVA where condition had two levels (surrogate predictions and surro-
gate choices) and order had two levels (predictions first and predictions
second). In the financial domain, there was a main effect of condition
whereby choices were more risk-averse than predictions (F1,73=4.342,
MSe=536.037, p=.041, gp
2=0.056). We also found an interaction between
condition and order (F1,73=4.342, MSe=536.037, p=.019, gp
2=0.073). A simple
effects analysis indicated that there were no differences between predic-
tions and choices when predictions were completed first (mean differ-
ence=-1.182, p=.827), but there were when they were completed second
(mean difference = 16.941, p=.001). Predictions were more risk-seeking than
choices only when they were completed after choices by participants. On
the other hand, the predictive relationship between predictions and choices
appeared in both groups as shown by regression analyses. The model was
significant for those that completed predictions first (F1,36=6.454, p=.016)
and those that completed predictions second (F1,36=6.123, p=.017). In the
medical domain, there was a main effect of condition whereby choices
were more risk-averse than predictions (F1,73=4.342, MSe=135.084, p=.016,
gp
2=0.077), but there was no interaction between condition and order
(F1,73=0.951, MSe=135.084, p=.333, gp
2=0.013).
General discussion
Summary of findings
Across all three experiments, we generally found discrepancies between
surrogate choices and predictions. Either self-other differences in choices
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and predictions did not manifest themselves in the same way (i.e. same dir-
ection or magnitude), or we found a self-other difference in one but not
the other. These discrepancies in mean values across participants are in line
with findings from previous studies (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012; Stone
& Allgaier, 2008; Stone, Choi, de Bruin, & Mandel, 2013). On the other hand,
we were able to examine whether surrogate predictions are related to
choices, which paints a different picture of their predictive relationship.
Indeed, even in cases which presented these mean discrepancies, we found
that surrogate predictions were predictive of surrogate choices.
Interestingly, the only case in which we did not find such a relationship was
in Experiment 1 where self-other differences in choices and predictions
were similar.
This shows that concluding that surrogate choices are not informed by
surrogate predictions from a mean difference might be misleading. The cru-
cial difference here was that we used a within-subjects design4 which
allowed us to directly compare participants’ predictions and choices.
Without these analyses, we would not have been able to see the relation-
ship between the two, and instead would have concluded that predictions
and choices were at odds with one another. It is possible that this design
encouraged participants to consider predictions in their choices, although
we did not find order effects in Experiment 2. However, it is in fact more
relevant to real-world occurrences of surrogate decision-making where sur-
rogates are instructed to make a simulated decision and therefore do con-
sider them.
Comparing surrogate decisions across domains
In the financial domain, we did not find any self-other differences. Although
surrogates did not believe others would value each option offered by the
choice differently (Experiment 1), they perceived others’ choices to be more
risk-seeking than their own (Experiment 3). Given that participants were
risk-averse for both themselves and the recipient, our findings are consist-
ent with previous studies that show that surrogates believe others make
more risk-neutral choices than them (Faro & Rottenstreich, 2006; Hadar &
Fischer, 2008; Hsee & Weber, 1997; Krishnamurthy & Kumar, 2002).
Furthermore, we failed to find a relationship between surrogate choices
and predictions in Experiment 1, but we did in Experiment 3. The difference
between the two experiments was that predictions were elicited using
4The studies we presented here also manipulated the recipient as a within-subjects factor, which
raises the possibility that self-other differences may be contingent on that manipulation. However,
similar findings have also been reported using between-subjects designs in both the medical
(Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2006; Ubel et al., 2011) and financial domain (Polman, 2012; Pollmann et al.,
2014; Sun et al., 2016).
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different tasks. This suggests that surrogates are integrating their percep-
tion of the recipient’s risk preference in their decision-making (Experiment
3), but not their perception of the recipient’s utility for each option of the
choice separately (Experiment 1). Moreover, although there was no overall
self-other difference in choices, we did find that the difference between
participants’ own choices and their predictions of someone else’s was pre-
dictive of the self-other difference. Interestingly, we only found discrepan-
cies between choices and predictions when participants completed
predictions after choices in Experiment 3. This suggests that participants
might have conformed their choices to their predictions when made after,
but not the other way around. Nevertheless, this did not affect the relation-
ship between surrogate predictions and choices.
In the medical domain, we found that the severity of the condition had
an impact on self-other differences. Contrary to the interpersonal domain
(Beisswanger et al., 2003; Stone & Allgaier, 2008), self-other differences
were more pronounced for severe than moderate conditions, again sug-
gesting that surrogate decisions are not directly comparable across
domains. Our finding that decision-makers take fewer risks for someone
else than for themselves when making decisions about severe conditions
are consistent with the literature. We have also shown that ordinary deci-
sion-makers are more risk-averse for strangers. It could therefore be the
case that surrogates tend to take fewer risks for others in the medical
domain regardless of their role, but that doctors have additional responsi-
bility and professional obligations which warrant a further reduction in risk-
taking5. This shows that surrogates are more risk-averse for others regard-
less of whether they are a stranger or a close other (Zikmund-Fisher
et al., 2006).
We found a clear relationship between surrogate predictions and choices
for severe illnesses. Nevertheless, we still found differences between surro-
gate choices and predictions, which shows that surrogate choices are not
completely accounted for. As with financial decisions, we find that partici-
pants’ own choices have a strong relationship with their surrogate choices.
However, there is still variability in surrogate choices that is unaccounted
for. Given that surrogate choices were more risk-averse than surrogate pre-
dictions and people’s own choices, we suggest that participants did not
want to be accountable for taking a risk that would harm the recipient and
therefore preferred to take a safer option; an account that has been
explored with medical professionals (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012).
5Indeed, Garcia-Retamero, Okan, and Maldonado (2015) conducted a study with a student sample
and found that they were more risk-seeking for a classmate than for themselves, which contradicts
their previous findings with doctors using the same scenarios (Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012).
Notably, the severity of the illness depicted in the scenario they used was akin to that of our
moderate conditions which slightly increased risk-taking.
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Similarly, Petrova et al. (2016) found that participants made risk-averse
choices for a hypothetical sibling irrespective of whether the sibling would
have done so too, thereby suggesting that the predictive relationship
between surrogate choices and predictions might have been weaker if
there had been wider discrepancies between the two.
The relationship between surrogate choices and predictions was more
consistent in medical decisions than in financial ones. However, the choices
made in the financial domain were far less significant and life-changing,
indicating that perhaps surrogates are more likely to incorporate a simu-
lated approach when the significance of the decision is high. Indeed, surro-
gate predictions did not predict surrogate choices in financial decisions
with small amounts (Experiment 1), but they did predict financial decisions
with higher amounts or decisions for severe illnesses (Experiment 3). The
interaction between the significance of the decision and the likelihood of
making a simulated decision is therefore worth investigating.
Finally, across both domains, it does seem to be the case that surro-
gates are not willing to accept large risks on behalf of someone else, even
when they would do so themselves and expect the recipient’s utilities to
be similar to their own. This is consistent with accounts of self-other dif-
ferences based on caution when making decisions on behalf of someone
else, due to the responsibility placed on the decision-maker and the
uncertainty contained in making a decision in the absence of knowledge
of the recipient’s preferences. Nevertheless, we did not find that surro-
gates reduced their risk-taking for others when making financial decisions
or decisions concerning moderate illnesses. This could mean that import-
ant decisions elicit a precautionary approach, but that less significant
ones might not evoke a feeling of responsibility on the part of the deci-
sion-maker, who might put less thought into the decision process and
therefore be more inclined to making a similar decision to their own. On
the other hand, individuals may not be willing to take a high level of risk
for someone else to avoid making a decision that risks causing harm to
the recipient, either to avoid bearing that responsibility or due to moral
and social values steering them in that direction. These accounts would
benefit from being investigating in future research to better understand
the domain differences we report here.
Theoretical implications
The present findings are best understood within the framework of Tunney
and Ziegler’s (2015) model of surrogate decision-making. The accountability
held against the decision-maker and the significance of the decision are
both factors that are taken into account by the model and expected to alter
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surrogates’ perspective-taking. In terms of perspective-taking, we found evi-
dence suggesting that, when making decisions for a stranger, participants
relied on a projected perspective. This follows from the model’s prediction
that surrogates would default to reproducing their own choices in the
absence of knowledge about the recipient’s preferences. Nevertheless, par-
ticipants also seemed to take a simulated approach for financial and med-
ical decisions of higher significance. Notably, the projected and simulated
perspectives combined accounted for a much higher proportion of the vari-
ance in medical choices (69%) than in financial ones (10%), thereby indicat-
ing that the latter would benefit from further investigation. Alternatively, it
is possible that the relationships we identified between surrogate choices
and predictions or participants’ own choices are the result of a common
underlying mechanism, rather than reflecting participants’ perspective-tak-
ing. Although our findings are consistent with the latter, more work is
needed to ascertain that this is the case.
When participants accept more risk for themselves but lower risk for
others, this could be interpreted as them taking a more benevolent
approach – whereby they do not judge taking such a level of risk to be in
the best interest of the recipient, or a more egocentric approach – where
they do not want to be responsible for taking that risk. It is conceivable
that the higher the significance of the decision and accountability of the
decision-maker, the more likely it is that decision-makers take a cautious
approach, thereby focusing on a more benevolent or egocentric perspec-
tive. The model also predicts that individuals who are higher in empathy
will attribute more weight to a simulated perspective, which is supported
by findings by Petrova et al. (2016). Moreover, when surrogates are familiar
with the recipient’s preferences, they are expected to be more likely to take
a simulated decision. Future work should aim to address how individual dif-
ferences and the identity of the recipient might affect the relationship
between predictions and choices.
The Social Values Theory of surrogate risk-taking (Stone & Allgaier,
2008) emphasises the influence that social values can have on the deci-
sion process. It would make sense for high risk-taking to not be socially
valued in a medical context, particularly amongst health professionals,
which could account for why participants took fewer risks for others when
making important treatment decisions. In fact, Stone et al. (2013) report
that people take less risk for a friend in physical safety scenarios, even
when they predict their friend to take the same level of risk as them.
These results mirror ours and suggest that social values might be similar
across physical safety and medical treatment scenarios. However, given
our findings it seems unlikely that all surrogate decisions are driven solely
by social values.
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Conclusions and future directions
In this paper, we sought to investigate the relationship between surrogates’
predictions of a recipient’s utilities and the choices they make on their
behalf. We did find support for a predictive relationship between surrogate
predictions and choices. However, our findings indicate that self-other dif-
ferences in decision-making cannot be solely accounted for by a perceived
self-other difference in utilities. It would be interesting to examine whether
this is also the case when surrogates are explicitly asked to make a decision
based on the recipient’s wishes and preferences. This would strengthen the
conclusion that making a surrogate decision is a difficult task due to the
responsibility placed on the decision-maker and the higher level of uncer-
tainty relative to making one’s own decisions, making it unlikely that they
can accurately represent the recipient’s wishes and preferences.
Additionally, gaining more insight into the decision process through confi-
dence measures and thought-listing techniques would further elucidate the
decision process.
In order to develop a better understanding of how our study can speak
to real-world scenarios, future research should build on it by using more
realistic scenarios and investigating whether the present findings change
when people make decisions for someone they are familiar with. Our find-
ings can nonetheless speak to the wider research concerning surrogate
decision-makers which shows that surrogates have a difficult time trying to
reconcile the patient’s wishes with a multitude of other perspectives and
responsibilities (Dionne-Odom et al., 2015; Schenker et al., 2012), and that
the substituted judgment standard is limited in helping surrogates make
the right decision (Torke et al., 2008). On the other hand, it presents a more
hopeful picture than previous research which indicated that decisions are
not made in line with their predictions of the recipient’s preferences.
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Appendix: Medical scenarios
Severe conditions
Paraplegia: Imagine you suddenly develop paraplegia. You suffer from a com-
plete loss of sensation and movement from the waist down, meaning that your
legs are paralysed. You are wheelchair-bound and you lose control of your bladder
and your bowel. You require some assistance with self-care. Without treatment,
there is no chance of recovery.
Broca’s Aphasia: Imagine that you suddenly develop Broca’s aphasia (a type of
stroke). You will have a very difficult time speaking and writing. Nobody can
understand you except for maybe the one or two people closest to you. This is
very frustrating because you can understand other people but they don’t under-
stand you. You can speak a little but you have to work hard at it and most of the
words you say will not make sense. Without treatment, there is no chance
of recovery.
Vegetative State: Imagine you are the victim of an accident which leaves you
in a vegetative state. You are bed-bound and need to be fed through a tube. You
have almost lost all consciousness. You are unable to see, speak, and can barely
think. You can hear and understand some of the things that are going on around
you. You can slightly move your fingers meaning that you can occasionally com-
municate. There is no pain with this condition and without treatment, there is no
chance of recovery.
Moderate conditions
Angina: Imagine that you suddenly develop an angina. You have pain or dis-
comfort in mainly in your chest but also in your upper body. You suffer from
fatigue and occasional dizziness. You find breathing more difficult than usual. You
can take medication to alleviate the symptoms but these are persistent and with-
out treatment, there is no chance of recovery.
Headache: Imagine that you suddenly develop a persistent headache. You suf-
fer from an aching head pain and a sensation of tightness or pressure across your
forehead. You struggle to concentrate and the pain can render you unable to take
part in your daily activities. Medication does not entirely relieve the pain and with-
out treatment, there is no chance of recovery.
Nausea: Imagine that you develop an illness with symptoms of nausea. You
often feel discomfort in your stomach and you are occasionally sick. This makes it
more difficult for you to eat and get on with your day. You may be unable to
work if the discomfort is too high. You can take medication to reduce the symp-
toms and without treatment, there is no chance of recovery.
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